 |
By
Stephen Bernow and Sivan Kartha
Note: Steve Bernow, a former EcoEquity
Board Member, was the head of the Tellus Institute's Energy Department.
This is one of his last essays, written with Sivan Kartha of the
Stockholm Environment Institute shortly before his unexpected
death on July 5th, 200. He is missed. See www.tellus.org/steve
for information and testimonials.
This paper asks three questions that are
focal to devising an effective climate protection regime. The first
two questions - What is "adequacy"? and What
is "equity"? - arise from the observation that both adequacy
and equity are necessary features of an effective and politically
acceptable international climate regime:
- Adequacy requires that greenhouse gases
emissions decline sufficiently to "prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system."
- Equity requires that the obligations assigned
to nations for achieving this outcome reflects their radically
different responsibilities, capacities, and needs.
The third question "How do we reconcile
climate strategies with local realities?" asks how adequacy
and equity can be embodied in a climate regime in a manner that
addresses realities and goals at the local level, where both climate
change and sustainable development take their meaning. This paper
offers some initial thoughts
What is "adequacy"?
Parties to the UNFCCC have pledged to prevent
dangerous interference with the climate system. But they have not
proposed a long-term target to guide their work, nor have they even
defined "dangerous". Ideally, Parties would identify an unambiguous
threshold that separates "tolerable" interference from "dangerous"
interference. But they cannot, in part because uncertainties persist,
complicating scientists efforts to use GHG emissions trajectories
to precisely forecast atmospheric concentrations, concentrations
to forecast warming, and warming to forecast local impacts. Nor
do we know how effectively human and ecological systems could adapt
to those impacts, nor the precise cost of mitigating them. And perhaps
most worrisome, we do not know the precise thresholds for triggering
abrupt and irreversible high-impact events, such as a deterioration
in the thermohaline circulation, collapse of a major ice sheet,
or the release of greenhouse gases from large biotic or marine reserves.
In the absence of an unambiguous threshold
to steer us, our response must be robust to the broad range of foreseeable
outcomes that are consistent with our imperfect information. Our
response must accomplish three things:
- First, it must virtually guarantee that
catastrophic climate disruption is averted.
- Second, it should initiate a prompt and
orderly transition toward a low-GHG global economy and established
the foundation for much deeper long-term reductions.
- Third, it should ensure that we are well-positioned
to accelerate efforts if our path later proves too optimistic,
by developing low-GHG technologies, by building less long-lived
high-GHG infrastructure, and by firmly establishing the institutions
needed for a global climate regime and local responses. In short,
it must accord with the precautionary principle.
The path urged by the European Council might
be appropriately robust and prudent. At its October 2002 meeting
of environment ministers, the Council reaffirmed the "[European]
Community's position that global efforts should be guided by a long-term
objective of a maximum global temperature increase of 2 degrees
Celsius over pre-industrial levels... " (1)
The IPCC Third Assessment Report suggests that the
CO2 stabilization target consistent with a maximum 2 degree Celsius
warming in the 21st century is approximately 450 ppm (IPCC WGI,
2001; sec. 9.3). Current GCM modelling suggest that this stabilization
target could be met by holding cumulative emissions to ~565 GtC
while halving annual emissions by 2100, with continued reductions
thereafter. (2) An even lower path
would be needed to avoid further temperature increases in the following
centuries or to allow temperatures to return towards pre-industrial
levels.
Figure 1 shows this 450 ppm stabilization
trajectory and, for comparison, three other scenarios from the IPCC's
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, a high scenario (A2), a mid-range
scenario (A1B), and a low scenario (B1), all of which assume no
explicit climate policies.
Figure 1. The 450 ppm stabilization path,
and a high
(A2), mid-range (A1B), and low (B1) SRES scenario.
Of course, neither the 450 ppm stabilization
path nor any other path should be adopted as an unalterable course
of action. Our course should be modified as climate science develops
and more information becomes available, and as society itself evolves.
We might find our chosen path unnecessarily stringent, or we might
find it leading to a temperature rise exceeding our limit of tolerance.
Indeed, for the 450 ppm stabilization scenario, the uncertainties
in current climate science lead to a relatively wide range in the
estimated long-term temperature rise: from 1.5° to as much as 3.0°
Celsius.
What is "equity"?
The global resolve to work toward such a target
will only materialize if an equitable framework is offered. And
while the demands of equity can be argued forever, some points are
clear. It is, for example, obvious that an equitable framework would
acknowledge the disparity among nations in historic and continuing
emissions. It would also recognize that the world's majority lives
in poverty, and that relief from poverty will entail an increase
in energy services and an unavoidable near-term rise in carbon emissions.
To be sure, certain near-term carbon reduction measures can also
provide development co-benefits. But until a decent standard of
living is reached, the world's poor majority will defer ambitious
reductions, even as its aggregate emissions grow and exceed those
of the wealthy minority. Unless and until this occurs, significant
sacrifices cannot be expected. The poor majority will not be able
to afford to check its carbon emissions. Nor will it have access
to the technological and institutional capacities to do so. Nor
will it be inspired to do so, as long as the vast disparities in
per capita emissions rates persist among nations. This recognition
is explicitly - if ambiguously - reflected in the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol in the notion of "common but differentiated responsibilities."
A compelling case can be made that an equitable
approach would allocate emissions allowances to nations on an equal
per-capita basis, justified by the premise that the global capacity
to absorb carbon is a scarce and depletable common resource that
should be allocated equally. Fairness might warrant some modifications
to this strict per-capita allocation, since nations differ in respects
that might be relevant to their legitimate claim to this limited
global resource. Some national circumstances might be legitimate
grounds modifying a strict per-capita allocation (e.g., emissions
correlated with differences in natural resource endowments or climate-related
energy demands, or a gross intra-national disparity in access to
energy) , while others (e.g., emissions correlated with greater
affluence) might not.
Figure 2 shows how the global stabilization
path from Figure 1 might split between countries of the North (Annex
B) and countries of the South (non-Annex B), and Figure 3 shows
the per-capita trajectories implied by these emissions trajectories.
Note that the emissions trajectory for the North declines steadily
from today’s levels, leaving a modest amount of atmospheric space
for countries of the South to slightly increase their emissions
rate, over the next two decades, before it too declines. In this
hypothetical scenario, per-capita emissions from North and South
converge by the end of the century, from today’s radically differing
starting points. (3)

Figure 2. Emissions in North and South
consistent with 450 ppm stabilization path.

Figure
3. Per capita emissions in North and South
consistent with 450 ppm stabilization path.
Such a framework would incorporate some sort
of international trading (or exchange) mechanism through which countries
with per-capita emissions that exceed the global average could purchase
allowances from countries with per-capita emissions lower than the
global average. As a result, revenues would flow from the North
to the South for an extended period of time. Figure 4 shows the
annual flow of carbon allowances from the South to the North necessitated
by the paths shown figure 3. It also illustrates what the compensating
flow of revenues from the North to the South would be, based on
the very rough assumption that the carbon allowance price escalates
steadily (~2%/yr) from $10 to $100 per tonne of carbon over the
course of the 21st century in real terms.

Figure
4. Annual purchase of carbon allowances from South,
and annual flow of revenue
to the South (assuming an
allowance price increasing
from $10/tC to $100/tC).
Whereas these revenues would ostensibly compensate
for North’s greater use of the global capacity to absorb carbon,
it could actually serve as an investment at many levels. These revenues
could help fund the expansion of access to energy services for the
poor, adaptation to ongoing climate change, the long-term transition
to a low-GHG path in the South, and sustainable development in general,
providing they were targeted to do so. Doing so would require a
greater attention to the local meanings of adequacy and equity.
How do we reconcile climate strategies
with local realities?
Adequacy and equity, though critical terms
in the climate equity debate, do not of course outline the entire
range of concerns. This is, in the first instance, because they
are generally treated complementary and separable goals of the broad
climate regime: adequacy defines the global mitigation requirement,
and equity defines national responsibilities. Generally, these twin
goals are discussed in terms of averages – the global average temperature
rise, the national average per-capita emissions. Yet the spatial
distributions across regions and communities of these indicators,
and especially their extremes, cannot be ignored.
Adequacy is in its essence a local concept.
Even in a world with an ostensibly “acceptable” average global warming
of 2 degrees Celsius, some regions will suffer far greater local
warming, and correspondingly grave impacts. Shifts in temperatures,
rainfall, storm and drought patterns will affect different communities
to dramatically varying degrees. And those localities and groups
with the least capacity to endure and adapt will suffer most.
Like adequacy, equity is a local concept.
Evolving toward equal per-capita national emissions allowances is
worthy goal, particularly if adjusted for disparate national circumstances,
but it is not enough. The disparities in per-capita emissions among
nations are echoed within nations, and are associated with disturbing
inequities in income, political power, and health. Fully two billion
of the world’s poorest lack even remotely modern energy services,
using their backs, legs, beasts, and often-scarce biomass resources
at best, and subsisting in dire deprivation at worst.
While global or national averages mask local
consequences, climate strategies must ultimately devolve to the
local level. As we devise a response to the threat of a changing
climate, we are pressed to answer profound questions: Whom and what
are we ethically obliged to protect when we adopt a stabilization
target? How and when should those individuals who are most victimized
by climate change – but least responsible – help to fight it? And
are we not morally bound to compensate and assist them in protecting
their livelihoods and engaging this struggle?
At the local level, the ability to protect
livelihoods from the inevitable impacts of climate change and to
move onto a low-GHG path will require that all of the key elements
of sustainable development co-evolve: satisfaction of basic material
needs, public health, strengthening of community resilience, widespread
education, technical capacity, ecological integrity, economic soundness,
social equity and solidarity, enfranchisement and democracy. But,
given that these challenges fall not merely upon nations but upon
communities within nations, a climate regime must ensure that communities
are empowered and enabled to respond.
Revenues earned by the South under a global
emissions trading arrangement based on a modified per capita allocation
could provide significant resources (see Figure 4) toward this challenge.
Yet there is no assurance that revenues will be thus targeted, unless
a framework is established specifically for this purpose. In particular,
since the primary challenge is to support sustainable development
at the local level, such a framework may prove most effective if
communities were helped directly. A global fund could be established
to do this[4], through which some fraction – perhaps half – of the
proceeds of the international trade in emissions allowances are
channelled.[5]
Such a fund would need a just and carefully
designed governance structure, which balances apparently competing
claims (and needs) of sovereignty across three loci. These are (i)
the local communities, representing the ecological and human specificities
of genuine sustainable development, (ii) nation states, representing
strategic vision and mediating between the national polity, communities,
and the international sphere, and (iii) the international community,
including development and environment NGOs, representing general
aims and principles of global and local sustainable development.
Such a fund would draw upon both political and civil society representation,
and would require carefully constructed principles, protocols, delivery
mechanisms, accountability provisions and evaluation procedures.
These steps would help place sustainable development at the foundation
of the fund.
One specific approach to greenhouse gas mitigation
in developing countries, known as Sustainable Development Policies
and Measures (SD-PAMs), advocates activities to reduce emissions
that are designed and implemented consistent with other high-priority
social development goals, as defined at the local level. By definition,
such activities are in the best interest of developing countries,
but to the extent that they call for larger capital investments,
better institutional coordination, advanced technologies, etc.,
there will be barriers to their effective implementation. A fund
such as that discussed above, administered in a manner so as to
target SD-PAMs activities, could be very effective at enabling developing
countries to transition to sustainable, low-GHG development trajectories.
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
The dual goals of adequacy and equity lie
at the heart of a reciprocal relationship between climate protection
and sustainable development: a stable climate is necessary for society
to pursue sustainable development, while real sustainable development
is conversely needed to ensure a stable climate. A rich discourse
and democratic enfranchisement, which is a human rights issue of
intrinsic merit, is therefore also needed to ensure the legitimacy
and effectiveness of a just climate regime in the near term, and
to secure the social and material basis for a sustainable world
in the not too distant future.
Endnotes
1. The quoted document
defines the European Union's negotiating position for COP 8, and
goes on to say "...and a stabilisation of CO2 concentrations below
550 ppm. This is likely to require a global reduction in emissions
of greenhouse gases by 70 percent compared to 1990, as identified
by the IPCC;" 2457th European Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 17 Oct,
2002. (ue.eu.int/pressData/en/envir/72808.pdf )
Return to text.
2. We are describing
here the WRE450 emissions trajectories (Wigley, 1996; 2000), although
there are other paths consistent with stabilization at 450 ppm.
Radically different paths may be mathematically valid, but since
the starting and end points and the integral are essentially fixed,
they might require impractically rapid technological and socio-economic
changes.
Return to text.
3. It is noteworthy
that the cumulative emissions of North would still far exceed those
of the South for many decades, even in this scenario where annual
emissions from the South soon exceed those of the North.
Return to text.
|
 |